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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OP UTAH 
KELLY ARLIN BLACK, : 
Appellant/Plaintiff, : (Argument Priority No. 6) 
vs. : Indust. Comm. #85000922 
MCDONALD'S OF LAYTON, and/or : 
STATE INSURANCE FUND, Case No. 860296 
Respondents/Defendants. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
1. Was the plaintiff, Kelly Arlin Black acting in the course 
and scope of his employment with McDonald's of Layton when he was 
driving to a softball game against McDonald's of North Ogden and 
struck and injured by another vehicle while traveling to that 
game? 
2. Was the Industrial Commission's decision which denied 
Workmen's Compensation benefits to Kelly Arlin Black, arbitrary 
and capricious or wholly without cause? 
1. On June 13, 1985, Kelly Arlin Black was injured in an 
automobile accident when the car he was driving was hit by a 
truck. (R 43, 44) On the day in question, Mr. Black was employed 
by McDonald's of Layton as a crew trainer. (R 19) 
2. Immediately before the accident, Mr. Black and four 
other McDonalds of Layton employees were on their way to a 
Softball game against the employees from the North Ogden 
McDonalds. (R 44) 
3. The Softball games in question were organized by 
employees of the various participating McDonalds Restaurants, who 
established divisions within the league and the rules and 
regulations. (R 250, 258) 
4. The softball league was composed of McDonalds stores 
ranging in an area from Salt Lake to Tooele to Ogden. The stores 
themselves participated on a voluntary basis. (R 311, 312, 117) 
5. At the beginning of the season each participating store 
contributed approximately $25.00 or $35.00 to the league for the 
purchase of scorebooks, softballs and trophies. This fee was paid 
by the Layton McDonalds on behalf of its employees. (R 294, 297, 
313) 
6. Trophies were offered to the winning teams of each 
division, the play-off runner up and the play-off champion. The 
money remaining after the purchase of scorebooks, softballs and 
trophies would be divided 75% to the championship team and 25% to 
the runner-up team, which money would go to the store itself and 
not the individual players. (R 33, 291, 292, 263, 64) At the end 
of the 1985 season the championship team received $90.00 and the 
runner-up team received $30.00. (R 264) 
7. The McDonalds of Layton employees were informed of 
these softball games through a sign-up sheet on the employee 
bulletin board and were also told about the games by their fellow 
employees. (R 25, 31, 83, 116, 306, 353, 355) 
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7. The fact that a prospective employee may or may not 
play softball has never been a condition of employment and has no 
bearing on whether or not a person is hired at McDonalds of 
Layton. (R 76, 106r 107f 195) 
8. Employee participation in these softball games was 
completely voluntary and no one was required to play. (R25f 111, 
198, 257, 307) 
9. Any employee who wished to participate in the games had 
to find a work replacement or request time off in advance if he 
or she was scheduled to work during a game. The players received 
no priority treatment regarding scheduling. (R 30, 84, 112, 163, 
166, 197) 
10. The employees were not paid for the time they spent 
participating in the games. (R 26, 84, 197, 289, 307) They did 
not receive, neither were they offered any free food, drink or 
special privileges or benefits in connection with participation in 
these softball games. (R 72, 121, 200, 307) 
11. The employees found their own transportation to the 
games, volunteering the use of their vehicles, and paying their 
own transportation and gas expenses. (R 30, 31, 112, 113, 198, 
309) 
12. Each home team was responsible for reserving a ball 
park. The Layton McDonald's home games were played at Fisher 
Park in Clearfield. There was no cost for the use of the softball 
diamond. (R 24, 25, 72, 113, 303, 304) 
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13. The McDonalds of Layton provided the scorebook and the 
softballs at the home games. The employees furnished their own 
mitts, bats and any other equipment at all games. (R 31f 114, 
199) 
14. During the 1985 season some of the Layton players were 
given Tee-shirts that were purchased by the Layton McDonalds in 
1984. They were simple, numbered baseball shirts and had no 
McDonalds logo or symbol whatsoever and were not designed to in 
any way advertise McDonalds. The shirts were to be returned to 
the store by the players at the end of the season. (R 32f 33, 
114, 115, 200) 
15. These games were not advertised by McDonalds of Layton, 
and the softball league was not designed to advertise McDonalds in 
any way. (R 115, 244) There was no financial benefit to 
McDonalds of Layton for participating in these games, and the only 
benefit to the store was perhaps an improvement in employee 
morale. (R 107, 119, 291) 
SUMMARY.. OF, ARGUMENT 
Kelly Arlin Black alleges that he sustained injuries arising 
out of or during the course of employment with McDonalds of 
Layton, and therefore he is entitled to Workmen's Compensation 
benefits. It is respondents contention that when this injury was 
sustained, Mr. Black was not acting within the course or scope of 
his employment, nor for a purpose which would benefit his 
employer. Rather, he was engaged in an activity that had as its 
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main purpose to serve the social aspectf or other personal 
diversion of the employee. 
hRQumm 
POINT I 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S DECISION DENYING 
BENEFITS TO KELLY ARLIN BLACK SHOULD BE 
AFFIRMED BECAUSE THE INJURY SUSTAINED BY 
MR. BLACK CLEARLY DID NOT ARISE OUT OF OR IN 
THE COURSE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT. 
The Workers1 Compensation Act of Utah provides for compensa-
tion to be paid only to an employee who is injured "by accident 
arising out of or in the course of his employment." Utah Code 
Ann. Section 35-1-45 (1953, as amended.) According to Utah Case 
law and other authorities in the area of Worker's Compensation 
lawr there are a number of elements that must be considered when 
an employee is injured in connection with playing on a company 
team. 
The Utah case of h&eih&sh £&» x^InSiiStxial-GsmmissiQii # 
113 Utah 347f 195 P.2d 245 (1948) is strikingly similar to the 
present case. An employee of Auerbach Company was injured in an 
automobile accident while enroute to play basketball on a team 
sponsored by the company. This team was part of the companyfs 
public relations and advertising campaign. The injured employee. 
Miss Wardle was not hired as a basketball player and she was paid 
only for her work as a cashier. However, her expenses were paid 
by her employer when she travelled with the team. Her playing 
basketball was not a condition of employment when she was hired, 
and her involvement with the team was completely voluntary. The 
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team was known as the "Auerbachs Shamrocks", and they wore 
uniforms with the word "Shamrocks" printed thereon. Not all of 
the players on the team were employees of Auerbachsf and any 
income from the games went to the company. The accident took 
place at night, after her duties at Auerbachfs had ended. 195 
P.2d at 245. 
The Industrial Commission found that Miss Wardle was injured 
in the course of her employment. On appeal, the Supreme Court 
disagreed and set aside the award. The Supreme Court considered 
the following facts to be important: 
(a) the Company did not employ Miss Wardle as a basketball 
player; 
(b) she was not required to participate in the games; and 
(c) she was not paid as a cashier on a basis that included 
the playing of basketball as an element of 
qualification. 
The court stated, "The issue is limited to a question of whether 
or not as part of her employment as cashier she was under the duty 
of playing basketball. We think not." Id. at 246. 
The court further stated: 
In this case, one of the most important 
elements of the master-servant relationship 
is missing—that of the right to control the 
employment. Right to control in this case 
does not mean merely coaching control, the 
purpose of which is to produce teamwork when 
the alleged employee plays; but means the 
right to require performance of a duty to 
play, if such a duty exists. * * * 
Participants in a contest are subject to 
control for the purposes of safety; teamwork 
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on a basketball team is subject to control 
for purposes of efficiency in playing. 
Neither howeverf is the control contemplated 
by the Workmen's Compensation Act* 
Id. at 246. 
According to the elements outlined by the court in the 
Auerbacfr decision, Kelly Black and the others in his car cannot 
be said to have been injured during the course and scope of their 
employment. In the present casef as in Auerbach* the employees 
were not employed as Softball players, they were not required to 
participate in the games, and they were not paid by McDonalds on 
a basis that included playing Softball as a qualification. As 
part of their employment for McDonalds, the occupants of Kelly 
Blackfs car were under no duty to play Softball. Furthermore, the 
element of the employer's right to control is missing in the 
present case, just as it was in hii£Lb2£h* 
The present facts amount to an even stronger case for finding 
no course of employment than the facts in the Auerbach decision. 
In this case, McDonalds gained no advertising benefits as did 
Auerbachs; the employees here did not receive transportation 
expenses as did the Auerbachs employees; and McDonalds received no 
financial benefit from these games whatsoever, whereas Auerbachs 
received income from the games, although an amount that hardly 
kept up with team expenses. Accordingly/ Mr. Black should be 
denied worker's compensation benefits. 
On page six of petitioners appellate brief, he attacks the 
Auerbach decision because that case was decided in 1948 and "the 
concept of the Workman's Compensation Law has substantially 
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changed, and other Utah cases have seemed to retreat from some of 
the rationale of that decision." (Petitioners Brief page 6.) 
However, the Auerbach decision has never been reversed, 
overruled, or even questioned by any subsequent Supreme Court 
decision. In fact, it was cited as authoritative as recently as 
1980 in the KinDS^jL^In^liSirli^l^smmiSSlQHr 609 P. 2d 926, at 928. 
(Utah 1980) decision. It is therefore still a valid and binding 
precedent for the present case. 
The applicant also cites the case of ££ZQU£ su^InAiiSillAl 
Soromj-spjlppy 2 Utah 2d 270f 272 P.2d 187 (1954) in support of his 
position. Aside from the fact that the Stroud case is nearly as 
old as the Auerbach decision, the facts in that case can be 
distinguished entirely from the present facts. In gtroudf 
the injured police officer was at the police station on his day 
off in order to check out a police car to two other officers. The 
men he was to meet were delayed, and Mr. Stroud began transferring 
beverages to his automobile while waiting for their arrival. He 
was killed while thus engaged, when his gun fell and discharged, 
the bullet entering Stroudfs heart. 272 P.2d at 188. The Supreme 
Court held that Stroud was killed during the course of his 
employment, for reasons that are not present in the instant case: 
"Stroud was authorized and required to carry 
his gun during his working hours; he carried 
it for the benefit of his employer and the 
employer thus was on notice that an accident 
of this type is an ordinary risk of a police 
officer. He had not abandoned his occupation 
and was performing the duty of waiting for 
the other officers." 
272 P.2d at 190. Stroud is therefore not persuasive here. 
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Applicant next relies on the case of Martipgpp Yj^WrM 
Insurance Assncy^ Ins^r 606 P.2d 256 (1980) to support his 
claim. Howeverf even according to the standards announced in 
Martinson# Mr. Black and the other car occupants were outside the 
course of their employment at the time of the accident. The first 
test stated in H&xtiiiSQn is "whether such a trip is one which 
someone else would have had to make for the employer at some time 
if the claimant had not." 606 P.2d at 258. Had Mr. Black not 
made the trip to the game, the employer would not have sent 
another employee in his place, because softball game participation 
was purely voluntary, and McDonalds of Layton gained no direct 
benefit from the games and had no interest in directing any of 
its employees to attend. 
The second and perhaps more relevant test of t&ai±in£QQ is 
"whether the paramount or predominant motivation and purpose of 
the trip or other activity is to serve the employer's interest, 
and the social aspects, or other diversion for one's own interest, 
is merely adjunctive thereto." I£. Although McDonalds of Layton 
may have benefitted indirectly from the softball games through 
improved employee morale, it cannot be said that the predominant 
purpose of the games was to serve the employer's interest. In 
fact, the opposite is true. The predominant motivation and 
purpose of the activity was in serving the social aspect, or other 
personal diversion of the employees. (R 291, 107, 263) This 
again points to the conclusion that there was no injury in the 
course of employment. 
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Petitioners reliance on 82 Am. Jur. 2d as supporting his 
claim is also misplaced. As stated in the sections quoted by 
petitioner, the so called "trend" throughout the country of 
finding persons engaged in company sponsored recreational activity 
to be within the scope of their employment when injured is based 
upon a number of elements that simply were not present in this 
case. The citation mentions the importance of such factors as 
whether the injury occurred on or off employer premises, during 
working hoursf whether the employer required participation in the 
eventf whether the employer derived some benefit from the 
activity, and the extent of employer control or participation in 
the event. All of these elements are discussed in Larson, 
W&ikmnls-QQmsensstiQn-haM, vol IA. 
By examining the Larson treatise, and applying its basic 
tenets to the facts and testimony of the case at bar, it is clear 
that Mr. Kelly Black was not acting within the scope of his 
employment at the time he incurred injuries. 
Professor Larson, in his treatise on ESLLkmenlS-QQR&ens&tlQn 
Law, discusses the problem of employees who are injured as a 
result of their participation in company teams. The four cate-
gories of tests that have evolved from various jurisdictions 
include: 
(a) whether the games take place on or off the premises and 
in or out of working hours; 
(b) employer initiative; 
(c) employer contribution of money or equipment; and 
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(d) quantities and types of employer benefit. 
Larson, Workmen's Coipp.gnsatifii3„L3w, Vol, 1A Section 22.24 (a) 
p. 5-139. 
The first element discussed by Larson is the time and place 
of the activity in question. He states that if a game is played 
on the employer's premises during working hours "compensability 
has been seen to be clear." Larson, supra, Section 22.24(b). 
Likewise, the opposite is also true: 
"[I]f the games are played both off the 
premises and after hours, the burden of 
proving work-connection falls heavily on the 
factors of employer initiative, financing, 
and benefit, and a showing on these points 
which might have sufficed in a case with some 
time or place work-coiinection may well prove 
to be inadequate. Id. 
In the present case, the Softball games in question were all 
played off of the employer's premises and during non-working 
hours. Applicant has therefore failed to meet the time and place 
test as outlined. 
Professor Larson, in speaking of employer initiative, 
states: "If the employees have organized a Softball league 
entirely on their own initiative, with no suggestion from the 
employer . . . the activity begins on an entirely different 
footing from, for example, [a] recreational program . . . which 
was actively promoted by the employer, even to the extent of 
having a paid supervisor." Larson, supra, Section 22.24 (c). 
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In the present casef the softball league was started when a 
number of McDonalds employees expressed an interest in forming a 
league. They originally coordinated their efforts through Mr. 
John Parisi, an operations consultant for the McDonalds Salt Lake 
Office. (R 226) Mr. Parisi volunteered his time and efforts in 
helping with the league because he had been involved in similar 
leagues while working for McDonalds in Los Angeles. (R 232) The 
Utah games began in 1983, when some McDonalds employees approached 
Mr. Parisi and desired to play softball. (R 232-233). Mr. Parisi 
received no encouragement in 1983 from the company to set up the 
program. (R 235) 
In 1984 and 1985 alsof employees expressed a desire to play 
softball to Mr. Parisif so he helped them get organized. (R 241, 
249f 250) 
A meeting was held in May of 1985 with the employees, mostly 
crew people as opposed to management personnel, who were 
interested in playing. (R 250) Commissionersf treasurers and 
team captains were elected among those present, who set up the 
playing divisions, established the rules and handled the money. 
They handled the entire program. (R 250) Any problems that arose 
during the playing season were handled by the Commissioners. (R 
252) The teams also furnished their own umpires from among the 
players. (R 16, 202, 310) Release forms were also drafted up for 
employees to sign so that it would be understood that the softball 
games were not sanctioned functions of McDonalds. (R 257) Mr. 
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Parisi was of the opinion that the corporation of McDonalds was 
not involved with the games, (R 258) 
These facts all indicate that there was little if any 
employer initiative in that the games were organized, policed and 
conducted by the employees themselves. 
^„Finan£ial_Suppoit_3I^ 
This third test of work-connection'concerns "the furnishing 
of financial support, athletic equipmentf prizes and the like by 
the employer." Larson, supra, Section 22f24(d). In speaking on 
this element, professor Larson states: 
Although facts of this kind are helpful in 
building a cumulative case of employer 
involvement, standing alone they are 
ordinarily not enough to meet the burden of 
proof. Among the tangible employer contribu-
tions that have failed to produce compen-
sability are these: $1000 for equipment, 
which was dispensed through regular company 
forms and was stored on company premises; a 
$500 subsidy; equipment and a $50 entrance 
fee; uniforms and the Industrial League fee; 
uniforms, equipment, and fees; an allowance 
of $225; a grant of $150 over a two-year 
period. 
Larson, supra, Section 22.24(d). 
There is conflicting evidence as to the amount of money 
McDonalds of Layton contributed to the Softball team. The 
testimony at the depositions estimated $25.00 to $35.00. (R 119, 
254, 294) In any event, compared to the amounts that were cited 
by Larson which failed to produce compensability, a $35.00 
registration fee to cover the cost of trophies, scorebooks, 
softballs and a small cash prize hardly amounts to the necessary 
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financial support needed to establish activity within the course 
of employment. 
It Eipplfiy£i_B£ii£fi;fc 
McDonalds of Layton received neither financial benefit nor 
advertising benefit as a result of the games in question. The 
only benefit the employer received was perhaps improved morale of 
its employees who participated in the Softball league. (R 107) 
Touching this area, Professor Larson writes: 
Controversy is encountered also when the 
benefit asserted is the intangible value of 
increased worker efficiency and morale. 
Basically, the trouble with this argument is 
not that such benefits do not result, but 
that they result from every game the employee 
plays whether connected with his work or not. 
In this respectf the argument is reminiscent 
of the same view sometimes heard in connection 
with the personal comfort cases; eating, 
resting, and the like do indeed improve the 
efficiency of the employee, but this is 
equally true (and even more true) of the 
sleeping and eating which he does at home. 
And so, just as in the sleeping and eating 
cases some arbitrary time and space limita-
tions must circumscribe the area within which 
the "benefit" establishes work-connection, the 
recreation cases must submit to some similar 
limitation, since otherwise there is no 
stopping point which can be defined short of 
complete coverage of all the employeefs 
refreshing social and recreational activities. 
I t sac he taJ££D ajs_£b£_iBajGri:ty-Yi£H-£ha£ 
£h£§§-&Qi&l£ an&sliiQienQY hensiitssis^nQt 
alcce ficsusb tc bLing-L&£L£a£iQn-xi£hin-.£h£ 
course Q£ jeinplQyiDfiBi. (Emphas i s added; 
foo tno t e s dropped.) 
Larson, supra, Section 22.33. 
Again, the applicant fails this final test for the reasons 
stated. 
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A recent case from another jurisdiction which refutes 
petitioner's claim that the "trend" throughout the country is in 
favor with allowing compensation in a case such as the one at bar 
is Mss^XjL^hxgQnaiit-InsiHLanss-QQmsanies, 77 Or. App. 167, 711 P.2d 
218 (1985). In Rose/ an employee suffered injury in a Softball 
game played by a company team after work. The court held that the 
employee's injury during the softball game was not work related 
where the game occurred after work hours and off premises/ 
employer did not organizef manage, or control the team, employees 
were not required to play, employer's only contribution was $100, 
and employer's only benefit was indirect advertising received 
through jerseys. The court so held even though the employer 
encouraged employees to sell cars (engage in business) at games, 
and even though employer encouraged players to play on the team. 
Thus, it is readily apparent that when the factors which 
Larson speaks of in his treatise are in accord with the facts in 
EQ&S, as well as in the case at bar, it is incumbent upon a court 
to find that the injury sustained was not incurred during the 
course of employment. 
On page 9 of the Petitioner's brief he states that the 
employer made "strong overtures that participation in the softball 
program would be looked upon favorably", thus amounting to 
"indirect and compelling pressure" to attend the games. However, 
the testimony in the depositions consistently established that 
softball playing was never a condition of employment and that 
participation was strictly voluntary. Kelly Black himself 
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testified that the person who interviewed him for his job never 
indicated that playing softball was a pre-requisite for employ-
ment (R 76) and that participation was voluntary. (R 25) 
Furthermore, the gentleman who interviewed Mr. Black testified as 
follows: 
Q. . . . When you interview people for 
employment, do you ever make it a rule to 
discuss the softball games with them? 
A. No. 
Q. Does the fact that whether or not a 
prospective employee plays softball make any 
difference in your decision whether or not to 
hire them? 
A. Absolutely not. 
Q. So if you do discuss the subject of 
softball, what's the purpose of it? 
A. It's never discussed during the 
Interview. 
(R 106, 107) There is conflicting evidence as to whether or not 
softball was discussed at Mr. Black's pre- employment interview. 
However, there is no doubt that playing softball was never a 
condition of employment at McDonalds of Layton. (R 195) 
The case relied upon by the applicant on this pointf Lattices 
v. Industrial £Qmmi££iQn-Q£ AlJLzfiBSf 78 Ariz. 401, 281 P.2d 113 
(1955) is inapplicable. The language cited from the LatfI£B££ 
decision by the applicant is merely dictum, because the court 
stated, "the case at bar presents no occasion to hold that the 
'encouragement' petitioner received constituted direction. On 
the facts established by the Commission the luncheon was an 
integral part of the employer's business plan." 281 P.2d at 115. 
16 
Because the employer1s business was advanced at the meeting 
attended by the employee prior to his injury, he was awarded 
benefits. There are no similar facts in the present case. 
The cases listed in the string cite on page 8 supporting the 
Applicant's argument that a suggestion or encouragement by an 
employer is tantamount to an express order are also distinguish-
able from the case at hand. For instance, in SijSJsfiDis^^^^UDiifid 
^Y£l£i£iBS„££IDP3Dyr H O Conn. 384, 148 A. 334 (1930), the 
claimant had received a direct order from his foreman to attend 
the company picnic. The employees who attended were paid and 
those who did not attend were not paid, and the employer provided 
transportation to the event. The facts are clearly not compar-
able . In Lykx3B^„£jQ££„£l^^ 
Cpmmi ssion, 3^ 111. 2d 410, 223 N.E.2d 150 (1967), the golf outing 
held in connection with the claimants injury was held on a 
regular working day. The court found substantial employer 
compulsion to attend because the employees were paid whether they 
attended the outing or not, and those who did not attend were 
required to work their regular duties. The employer also supplied 
food, drinks and prizes. 
in the case Uesen&snts £l_£fca:fc£D iU-Etfius Gas^QQmsanx, 243 
So.2d 561 (Miss. 1971), the employee died on an employer sponsored 
fishing trip and worker's compensation benefits were denied the 
dependents because there was no employer compulsion to attend and 
there was no showing of substantial benefit to the employer, even 
though one of the purposes of the event was to improve employer-
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employee relationships. If anything, this case supports the 
position of defendants. Eelly-X^-BaskenssLSk^atsi Qomsany, 10 NJ 
Super. 528, 77 A.2d 467 (1950) is also distinguishable. The 
employee was injured at an outing where the employer paid the 
costs of the outing along with the wages of employees attending. 
The outing was also a benefit bargained for in the wage agreement 
with the employer, and it provided the employer an opportunity to 
make speeches and present awards to employees. Finallyr in 
Ql^ysnaSI^^^LibSI^^Bii^&l^InSiil&nQS^QQ^, 396 S.W.2d 174 (Tex. 
Civ. App. 1965)f the court relied on Professor Larson's treatise 
as outlined in defendant's original Memorandum, and cited the rule 
that an employer must derive a substantial benefit from the 
activity in question h£XQnd the intangible value of improved 
employee health and morale before he will be found within the 
course of employment. 
Although there may be a few cases which allow recovery on 
the sole basis that the event in question provides improved 
employee relations and builds morale, these are a minority and 
should be disregarded. As stated previously, according to 
Professor Larson, a noted authority in the area of Worker's 
Compensation law, the majority view is that "morale and efficiency 
benefits are not alone enough to bring recreation within the 
course of employment." Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law, Vol. 
1A Section 22.33. It is interesting to note that the petitioner's 
brief fails to cite Larson altogether. 
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POINT II 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S DECISION WHICH 
DENIED WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION BENEFITS TO 
KELLY ARLIN BLACK WAS NOT ARBITRARY OR 
CAPRICIOUS, WHOLLY WITHOUT CAUSE, OR WITHOUT 
ANY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT IT; AND 
THEREFORE THE ORDER OF THE INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION MAY NOT BE OVERTURNED. 
The standard of review which has been utilized by this Court 
in Industrial Commission cases is stringent and there are numerous 
cases which have articulated the power or scope of review which 
the Utah Supreme Court possesses with regard to decisions handed 
down by the Industrial Commission. One such case which clearly 
sets forth the proper standard is Kaiser Stssl £fiiP£I3iiflI2 
v. Monfredi, 631 P.2d 888 (Utah 1981). In telSSI, the Court 
stated: 
Under any of these standards . . . it is 
apparent that this Courts1 function in 
reviewing Commission findings of fact is a 
strictly limited one in which the question is 
not whether the Court agrees with the 
Commission's findings or whether they are 
supported by the preponderance of evidence. 
Instead, the reviewing court's inquiry is 
whether the Commission's findings are 
"arbitrary or capricious," or "wholly without 
cause" or contrary to the "one [inevitable] 
conclusion from the evidence" or viithout "any 
substantial evidence" to support them. Only 
then should the Commissions findings be 
displaced. 
631 P.2d at 890. 
Accordingly, applying the above cited authority to the case 
at bar, the Supreme Court is powerless to overturn the Industrial 
Commission's order unless it can be said that the Commission 
clearly acted arbitrarily and capriciously in denying Mr. Black 
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Workmenfs Compensation benefits. Such is not the case and the 
decision is not subject to the Supreme Court's scope of review. 
The pertinent facts of this case are uncontradicted. 
Mr. Black was injured while enroute to a softball game. The game 
was to take place off of his employers premises and after 
Mr. Black's work hours. The employer did not organize, arrange, 
or control the team, and Mr. Black was not required to partici-
pate. The employers contribution to such activity was very 
minimal, and there was no direct benefit accruing to the employer 
from such activity. 
In determining that Mr. Blackfs injury did not occur within 
the scope or course of his employment, the Industrial Commission 
considered the facts of this case, and applied the appropriate 
Utah case law which is consistent with the overwhelming majority 
of case law in this country. 
Thus, it cannot be said the Industrial Commission's decision 
was arbitrary or capricious, wholly without cause, or contrary to 
one inevitable conclusion. Accordingly, the decision of the 
Commission is not subject to reversal. 
Petitioner has failed to cite any persuasive authority to 
support his claim of being injured within the course and scope of 
his employment. According to the majority view, as stated in Utah 
case law and other decisions throughout the nation, the facts in 
this case indicate that Mr. Black and the other occupants of his 
car were not injured during the course and scope of their employ-
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ment. They were enroute to an activity that had as its main 
purpose to serve the social aspect, or other personal diversion of 
the employees* 
Further, because the Industrial Commission's decision denying 
benefits to Mr. Black was not arbitrary or capricious, or wholly 
without cause, the decision of the Commission is not subject to 
reversal. 
Therefore, respondents herein respectfully request that the 
Utah Supreme Court affirm the order of the Industrial Commission 
which denied benefits to Kelly Arlin Black. 
DATED this /%_ day of November, 1986. 
BLACK & MOORE 
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